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Abstract 
This paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the issue of 
agricultural trading system and global food crisis. The main purpose of the research is to identify the relation-
ship between world trading system and 2007-2008 food crisis by discussing some agricultural domestic and 
trade policies as well as selected World Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural trade rules and provisions that 
have a bearing on response measures to the soaring food prices. Systematization literary sources and ap-
proaches for solving the problem of what contributed to the food crisis indicates that though analysts attributed 
2007-2008 global food prices spike to various causes, the crisis has its long-term origins in trade policies and 
agricultural trading system. The relevance of the decision of this scientific problem is that food security are 
important to the developing countries, and food security is not determined by where the food is produced, but 
by whether individuals have access to it. Investigation of the topic on food crisis contributing factors in the 
paper is carried out in the following logical sequence: the description of the food commodity prices evolution 
in the historical context, followed by the discussion on agricultural trading system, including domestic trade 
policies as well as the selected WTO agricultural trade rules, and reflections upon recent development on 
relevant research, agriculture policy as well as WTO negotiation developments. Methodological tools of the 
research methods were decades of years of research in the field of agricultural trade and food security. The 
object of research is the countries in the world, especially WTO members, because namely they are the ones 
who develop these trading system and policies. The paper presents the results of an empirical analysis, exam-
ining global agricultural trade policies and selected World Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural rules in the 
light of the 2007-2008 global food prices spike, which showed that (1) agricultural trade distortion policies are 
among the long-term contributors to the recent food prices spike; (2) export restrictions during 2007-2008 
played a critical role in pushing the food commodity prices upward; (3) the current WTO rules are weak in 
effect in disciplining export restrictions on food export. The research empirically confirms and theoretically 
proves that the most effective trade policy response to high food prices over the long term is greater liberali-
zation around the world, complemented by other domestic policies aiming at increasing agricultural produc-
tivity, linking rural communities to markets. The results of the research can be useful for negotiation in agri-
culture trade and domestic reform on agriculture policies. 
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1. Introduction 
World prices for the staple food commodities such as maize, rice, wheat, rose all their way since 2000 and 
more than doubled between 2000 and 2008.  Despite declines in the second half of 2008, prices remain well 
above the average levels of the past two decades. This development and trend have led to a fuller awareness 
and heightened concern about food security and food crisis all over the world.  
Many analysts attribute the prices spike to such causes: rapid economic and income growth in developing 
countries, new and increasing demand for food crops, low agricultural productivity, etc. 1 While there are many 
factors driving food commodities prices rapid increase, the most important ones are the increases in production 
costs, the devaluation of the dollar, and the rapid increases in the demand of biofuels on food crops. Other 
factors include droughts in major producing countries and low stocks following policy changes in major 
                                                     
1 There are many studies on the causes and consequences of the recent rising food prices by international organizations and research 
bodies. 
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producing countries. However, in addition to these factors there may have also been an element of market 
failure due to rising expectations, hoarding, speculation, and restrictions on grain exports (Lin, 2008). 
However, the soaring price does not mean it is a global food shortage. In fact, there is enough food to feed the 
world (IMF, 2008). The problem is that prices have risen to where many people cannot afford. Food security 
is not determined by where the food is produced, but by whether individuals have access to it (Sen, 1981). 
Governments can enhance food security by allowing imports of food when prices would otherwise have risen. 
International trade not only can improve resource allocation efficiency by allowing each country to produce 
according to its comparative advantage, but also is a cost-effective way to reduce the need for large public 
reserves at the national level.  
Therefore, to some extent, food crisis is pushed by trade policy, both domestic and international. From this 
point of view, the current spike in global food commodity prices has deep roots in decades of trade-distorting 
policies (Chauffour, 2008). These policies have encouraged inefficient agricultural production in rich countries 
and discouraged efficient production in developing countries. High-income countries have historically pro-
tected their domestic producers and subsidized inefficient production and dumped surpluses onto global mar-
kets. In turn, developing countries have often used trade and other domestic policies to simultaneously tax and 
protect their agricultural sector, with the net effect in many countries of taxing farmers.  
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some agricultural domestic and trade policies as well as selected World 
Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural trade rules and provisions that have a bearing on response measures 
to the soaring food prices. Countries around the world facing difficulties are taking a variety of responses to 
dealt with the food price spike. Some of these measures are policy instruments covered by the WTO rules. 
There are some concerns that the WTO commitments might bind countries from pursuing such measures as 
they further push the prices high. However, existing rules may not be adequately binding. One country’s policy 
responses may have adverse effects on other countries.  Yet, in other cases, there are no rules within WTO to 
help countries better cope with food crisis.  
I arrange the rest of the paper as follow. The second section describes the food commodity prices evolution in 
the historical context. The third section is devoted to the discussion on agricultural trading system, discussing 
the domestic trade policies from developed and developing countries and their impact on agriculture produc-
tion, as well as the selected WTO agricultural trade rules from the current Agreement on Agriculture and the 
ongoing negotiation draft texts. The fourth section provides reflections upon recent development on relevant 
research, agriculture policy as well as WTO negotiation. The last section concludes the paper. 
2. Recent Rising Food Prices and National Policy Responses 
The sharp rising food prices have attracted a great deal of attention in policy-makers, mass media, academic 
circle and enterprises. Are food commodity prices high? The answer depends. It depends on the food com-
modity in question, it depends on the period of comparison, and it depends on the term of prices, whether it is 
nominal or real.  
1. The 25-75 Characterization: Food Prices Spike in the Historical Context 
The recent food commodity prices spike is exceptional when viewed from the perspective of the last decade 
or so. Figure 1 shows the evolution of monthly world prices of rice, wheat, maize and soybeans from 2000 to 
2008. The prices started to rise dramatically from the second half of 2007, and it lasted until the end of the first 
half of 2008. The so-called “world food crisis” coalesced across the globe in 2007 and early 2008 when the 
price of rice, corn, wheat, soybeans and food more generally skyrocketed.  
However, when put in a longer historical context, the price spike is not alone.  In fact, since 1970, over a period 
of about four decades, there were five food commodity prices spikes. As it is shown in Figure 2, these were in 
1974-1976, 1980-1982, 1988-90, 1995-1997 and 2007-2008. Each crisis lasted for about 2 years for a total of 
10 years, or about 25% of the period. For the rest of the 75% of the time, world food prices could be said to be 
on decline trend or be depressed.  This is the so called “25-75 characterization” of the global food commodity 
price (Sharma and Konandreas, 2008).  
In addition, this point is based on nominal term. The real prices tell another story. In real terms or constant US 
$, the recent prices spike “are more like the blips in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s crisis (Piesse and 
Thirtle, 2009). The prices of wheat, rice, maize and soybeans were far less than the 1973-1974 peaks. With 
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FAO’s internal data, Piesse and Thirtle (2009) shows that in April 2008, wheat price was at 55% of the 1970s 
peak, maize at 41%, rice at 24% and soybeans at 39%, and that it was more a change from stable to rising 
prices when food prices started to rise in 2006.     
 
Figure 1. Major Food Commodity Prices, 2000 – 2008 by month 
Source: FAO Commodity price Database. 
 
Figure 2. Major Food Commodity Prices, 1967 – 2009 by month 
Source: IMF Commodity price Database. 
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UNCTAD’s price instability index2 also confirms the points made by Piesse and Thirtle (2009). Figure 3 de-
scribes the instability index over 1968 to 2007. The instability indices for 1998-2007 are generally smaller 
than the 1968-1977 period. This suggests that the recent food prices spike may no serious than the one during 
1970s. 
The first thing to notice from the above texts is that a high degree of price volatility is characteristic in world 
food commodity markets in nominal terms. It is true even when one looks at annual average prices. Prices are 
typically sensitive to short run shocks to either supply or demand because of delays between production deci-
sions and output. Volatility on international markets is further enhanced by policy interventions. These policies 
are designed to shift price risk away from producers or even keep it outside of the country entirely.  
 
Figure 3. Food Commodity Price Instability Index 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008 (online). 
The second thing to be noticed from Figures 1 to 3 is that the recent food price spike is neither the only, nor 
the most important one during the last 40 years. In real terms, today’s prices fall well below of peaks achieved 
in the early 1970s, and neither maize nor wheat prices during 2007-2008 are above levels during the mid-
1990s. Piesse and Thirtle (2009) shows food prices are going on a downward trend in real term. In addition, 
food prices are more stable during 1998-2007 than during 1968-1977, there are volatile than the previous two 
decades except for wheat. 
2. Briefs on the Drivers 
Although this is not the only food price spike in the past decades, it has drawn much attention of the govern-
ments and economist. It is worth to identify the factors contributing to the high-rising food commodity prices. 
Figure 4 summarizes the causes for rising food prices and shows that there are great deals of factors driving 
the prices upward. These factors, as mentioned earlier, include population growth, energy prices, bad weather, 
                                                     
2 Instability is measured as the percentage deviation of the variables concerned from their exponential trend levels for a given period. 
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etc. Piesse and Thirtle (2009) adds market speculation and panic to this list, and argues that there is a “specu-
lative bubbles for wheat, maize and soybeans” triggered by low-level stock and a “panic for rice” caused by 
export ban. The export ban of one exporter decreased the rice supply in the world, increased the urgency with 
rice importers, and raised the price expectation from other exporters (Mitchell, 2008). 
 
Figure 4. Factors Contributing to Higher Food Commodity Prices 
Source: Trostle (2008). 
For the purposes of this paper and the sharp-rising periods, we take a closer look at two of them: export and 
import policies. The national policy responses are discussed in next sub-section.  
The rapidly increasing world food commodity prices caused domestic food prices to rise at the consumer level 
in many countries. In response to rising food prices, some countries began to take protective policies to 
alleviate the impact of rising world food commodity prices on their own consumers. However, such measures 
typically force greater adjustments and higher prices onto global markets.  
In late 2007, some exporting countries made policy changes designed to discourage exports so as to keep 
domestic production within the country. The objective was to increase domestic food supplies and restrain 
increases in food prices. Such policies include eliminating export subsidies, raise or impose export taxes, 
export quantitative restriction and even export bans. 
Early in 2008, importing countries also began to take protective measures to combat rising food prices. Their 
objective was to make high-cost imports available to consumers at lower prices. The policies include reducing 
or eliminating tariffs, subsidizing consumers, etc. 
3. National Policy Responses 
Faced with persistently high prices, many governments have tried to limit the increase in domestic food prices 
by lowering import tariffs, reducing consumer taxes, raising general food subsidies or providing direct food 
assistance to the needy and vulnerable. Some countries have also resorted to export prohibitions or restrictions 
of different kinds. According to the World Bank (2008a), more than half (66.1%) of 115 countries have taken 
actions responding to higher food prices as suggested in Figure 5. Among the actioning countries, 64.5% re-
duced import taxes on food grain, 40.8% increase supply using food grain stocks, 40.8% imposed export re-
striction, and 60.5% took actions of price control / consumer subsidy. 
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Figure 5. Numbers of Countries Responding to High Food prices, by Policy Type 
Source: World Bank (2008a). 
A survey by the FAO (2008a, 2008b) on 77 countries suggests that approximately half of the governments reduced 
grain import taxes, 55 percent of the countries used price controls or consumer, one-quarter of the governments 
imposed some type of export restriction, and roughly the same proportion took action to increase supply, drawing 
on food grain stocks. Only 16 percent of countries surveyed showed no policy activities whatsoever.  
Policy actions vary considerably by region. Figure 6 reveals that countries in Africa, Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia had the lowest percentage to respond to the rising food prices. Countries in Middle East and North 
Africa, and South Asia were the most active ones in this regard. 
The FAO survey (2008a) shows that the governments sampled in East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East 
and North Africa have undertaken significant activities in all four areas of intervention. In every geographical 
region except sub-Saharan Africa, 50 percent or more of the countries reported using price controls or con-
sumer subsidies. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean regions showed the lowest policy 
activity, with roughly 20 percent and 30 percent of their countries, respectively, reporting no activity in any of 
the policy categories listed.  
 
Figure 6. Policy Responses to High Food Prices by Region and Percentage 
Source: World Bank (2008a). 
Among these policy responses, two are directly related to trade: reductions in import tariffs and export taxation, 
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or export restrictions. Reducing or eliminating import tariffs on food products has been the most widespread 
policy response for stabilizing domestic food prices. Do these measures really work in reducing the soaring 
food prices? In fact this policy has little effect in practice.  
To succeed and have a meaningful impact for this intervention, applied tariffs need to be sufficiently high at 
the time when world prices begin to rise. It is a common knowledge that despite having relatively high WTO 
bound tariffs, and applied MFN tariffs on basic foods are relatively low in a majority of the developing coun-
tries (WTO, 2008a). Sharma dn Konandreas (2008) suggest that to keep the domestic food prices stablized at 
the level of 2006, the computed applied tariffs are large negatives. Hence, even when reduced to zero, 
reductions in tariff levels were able to offset only a small proportion of the overall price rises of food imports.  
Export prohibitions, restrictions and export taxation reductions lower domestic prices but also reduce 
government revenues and producers’ income. In addition, export restraints exacerbate price instability in world 
markets and negatively affect importing countries. Export restrictions also have longer-term implications, as 
they discourage producers in exporting countries from investing in agriculture.  
The introduction of export restrictions on agricultural products by many large food exporters has compounded 
the crisis. These restrictions usually have major adverse economic and social effects. Export prohibitions and 
restrictions tend to exacerbate price increases in the world market, while excessive intervention in the domestic 
market would limit the transmission of higher prices to the farmer. As more countries implement export 
controls, world prices go up substantially up to 20 percent due to export restrictions, with particularly harmful 
effects in the case of rice (Chaufour, 2008).  
For the purpose of this paper, the effectiveness of these policy responses cannot be discussed in detail. But, 
clearly, they are mostly welfare reducing—both in the country applying them and in the rest of the world—
relative to direct first-best policy instruments for achieving those domestic objectives (Bhagwati 1971). 
3. Agricultural Trading System 
The current food crisis has deep historical roots in the distortions of the world trading system. Governments 
have intervened in food and other agriculture markets for decades, particularly through trade policies. Trade-
distorting policies have taken the form of tariffs, quantitative restrictions or prohibitions on imports and ex-
ports, domestic producer supports, and export subsidies for agricultural products. The various trade agreements 
and WTO rules further distort agricultural trading system. In this section, I discuss the agricultural distortion 
policies and their impact on the agricultural production, followed by discussing selected WTO agricultural 
rules, especially those governing export restrictions. 
1. Agricultural Trade Environment 
It is the pattern since the late 19th century that the higher the level of development of countries, the lower the 
overall trade restrictiveness, but the higher the level of trade restrictiveness in agriculture (World Bank, 2008b). 
Table 1 presents the trade restrictiveness indicators by country groups of different income level. While high-
income countries have the lowest overall barriers to trade (with overall trade restrictiveness indictor (OTRI) 
of 7.0 %), their  OTRI for agriculture is 43.1% as compared to 4.3 for manufacturing, and is the highest among 
the country groups. In terms of tariff trade restrictiveness indicator (TTRI), it is also the second highest for 
agriculture. The OTRI for agriculture is even higher of the four major economies (QUAD).   
Table 1. OTRI and TTRI by Income Group, 2006 (percentage) 
 Total Trade Agriculture Manufacturing 
High Income 
7.0 43.1 4.3 
2.1 12.4 1.4 
QUAD 
7.1 44.5 4.0 
1.9 11.1 1.3 
Middle Upper 
13.0 29.3 11.8 
4.6 6.6 4.5 
Middle Lower 
11.8 26.5 10.6 
6.5 11.5 6.0 
Low Income 
17.7 26.6 16.7 
10.8 15.3 10.4 
Note: TTRI in italics; OTRI in boldface. QUAD comprises Canada, the EU, Japan and the US.  
Source: World Bank (2008b).  
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The EU, United States, Japan, and China account for about 50 percent of world trade. All have policies that 
are more restrictive of trade in agricultural products than manufactures (Table 2), with Japan and the EU im-
posing significantly higher restrictions. Manufacturing trade is relatively less restricted: the TTRI is around 1 
percent in the EU, Japan, and United States. 
Table 2. OTRI and TTRI for the Four Largest Traders, 2006 (percentage) 
 2006 
 Total Trade Agriculture Manufacturing 
United States 
6.4 18.4 5.7 
1.6 3.8 1.5 
European Union 
6.6 48.7 2.9 
1.4 5.9 1.1 
Japan 
11.4 55.8 5.7 
4.5 31.1 1.1 
China 
9.9 17.1 9.5 
5.1 8.8 4.9 
Note: TTRI in italics; OTRI in boldface font. 
Source: World Bank (2008b).  
Agricultural trade restrictions and direct subsidies in high-income countries are a major source of support for 
producers. Although producer support estimates (PSEs) have fallen in some OECD countries since (for exam-
ple, Japan and the United States), they have increased in the European Union (EU), Korea, and a number of 
other OECD countries. Figure 7 presents the trends from 1986 to 2008.  Support to producers in OECD coun-
tries was estimated at US$258 billion in 2006 and US$266 billion, accounting for 26% and 21% of farm re-
ceipts respectively (OECD 2009a).   
The indicator used by the World Bank to measure support to agriculture producer is nominal rates of assistance 
to farmers (NRAs). The World Bank research (Anderson, Kurzweil, et al, 2008; Anderson and Valenzuela, 
2008) reveals that in terms of NRAs, the growth of agricultural support in high-income countries began to 
reverse only in the 1990s. However, if farm income support which is said to be decoupled from production 
incentives is considered, there is very little decline in the rate of support. 
 
Figure 7. Producer Support Estimates for OECD Countries, 1986 – 2008 
Source: OECD PSE/CSE Database, 2009. 
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Developing countries have also put in place trade policies that are highly restrictive of trade in agricultural 
products. All geographic regions have policies that are more restrictive of trade in agricultural products than 
manufactures, although the levels of trade restrictiveness in agriculture differ widely across regions (Table 3). 
Countries in South Asia have on average a level of trade restrictiveness in agriculture similar if not higher than 
that observed in high-income countries. At the other extreme, Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest level of ag-
riculture trade restrictiveness in the world.   
Table 3. OTRI and TTRI for Developing Country by Region and China, 2006 (percent) 
 Total Trade Agriculture Manufacturing 
East Asia 
11.3 26.6 10.4 
5.0 8.7 4.8 
Europe and Central Asia 
10.1 25.9 9.0 
4.5 10.3 4.0 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
15.0 28.1 13.8 
5.4 6.6 5.3 
Middle East & North Africa 
21.6 32.3 19.4 
11.9 12.1 11.8 
South Asia 
19.5 46.4 18.2 
14.0 31.4 13.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
14.4 24.9 12.9 
8.4 13.8 7.6 
Note: TTRI in italics; OTRI in boldface font.  
Source: World Bank (2008b).  
It is a common knowledge that policies in developing countries have generally taxed agriculture to channel 
resources into manufacturing until recently. The World Bank research (Anderson, Kurzweil, et al, 2008; An-
derson and Valenzuela, 2008) supports the widely held view that developing-country governments put in place 
agricultural policies that effectively taxed their farmers. The extent of taxation was of the order of 20 percent 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s. Since then, not only has it diminished, but developing countries have 
moved from taxing to subsidizing their agricultural sector. 
The NRAs differs by region for developing countries. African countries have shown the least tendency to 
reduce the taxing of farmers. The average NRA has been negative in all five-year periods except in the mid-
1980s, when international prices of farm products reached an all-time low in real terms. By contrast, for both 
Asia and Latin America, NRAs crossed over from negative to positive after the 1980s. In European transition 
economies, in the initial years of reform, nominal assistance to farmers was slightly negative, but thereafter it 
has trended upward (Anderson, Kurzweil, et al, 2008; Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008). 
OECD (2009b) reviews the agricultural policy changes of some developing countries such as Brazil, china, 
Chile and South Africa. The report shows that the PSE in these countries are much lower than that in OECD 
countries. Support to producers in Chile as measured by the %PSE has declined from 8% in 1995-97 to 4% in 
2005-07, in Brazil it averaged 6% in 2005-07 up from –5% in 1995-97, and in China increased from 3% in 
1995-97 to 9% in 2005-07. The levels are considerably lower than the OECD average of 26% in 2005-07 
(OECD, 2009b). 
The combined impact of these trade-distorting agriculture policies has reduced the efficiency of agriculture 
production globally, particularly in the developing world. These policies are also welfare redistributing and 
inherently discriminatory. They promote less efficient production in developed countries. This is at the cost of 
investment in generally more efficient production in developing countries. The result is both global agriculture 
production and world food commodity prices have been depressed at a low level, and domestic food commod-
ity prices in protected markets have been kept artificially high. In addition, because agricultural production has 
taken place in relatively inefficient, global trade in food products is less stable to exogenous shocks and less 
able to handle volatility in terms of trade, demand and output.  
If these distortions are eliminated or reduced, it will better the world. Anderson, Martin and van der Mens-
brugghe (2006) suggest that a move to free merchandise trade would increase farm employment, the real value 
of agricultural output and exports, real returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes in 
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developing countries.  The removal of all trade distortions together would lead to global gains of US$287 
billion per year by 2015. The gains of developing countries from improved efficiency of resources use would 
be US$115 billion. Self-sufficiency for developing countries improved for most agricultural products, such as 
wheat and rice. For most countries, farming activities would expand rather than collapse. The shares of devel-
oping countries in global agricultural output and exports would increase, thus contributing to better their living. 
2. Background of Current WTO Agricultural Rules 
Beginning in 1947, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), international trade was mov-
ing towards freer trade. Agriculture was never outside the GATT in name. However, some exceptions for 
agriculture were negotiated in the 1950s. This meant that the regular GATT rules did not apply to agriculture. 
Thus, to a large extent agriculture was excluded from the liberalization process.   
These exceptions provided legal cover to some countries. They could afford to apply import restrictions, sub-
sidize production without limit, and thus creating structural surpluses products. These structural surpluses had 
to be disposed somehow. Then, export subsidies and food aid turned out to be key instruments. The agricultural 
trade war was on the string of the bow.  
Let’s take a look at Figure 2, when the Uruguay Round was launched in 1986, the food commodity prices were 
historically low.  Rice was US$195.7 per ton, wheat was US$114.9 per ton, maize was US$87.8 per ton, and 
soybeans was US$188.9 per ton as compared to at US$332.4 per ton, US$255.2 per ton, US$163.3 per ton and 
US$317.3 per ton in 2007 respectively, not to mention the prices during early 2008.  
And, the world was holding more than one-third of a year’s production of wheat in storage and more than 40 
percent of a year’s production of corn in storage at that time (Keilke, 2008). The developed world was engaged 
in the competitive subsidization of agricultural exports in an attempt to dispose of products overproduced.  
Developing country exporters were caught in the cross-fire of a battle between developed countries. 
All these became unacceptable to the global community, and even to those that were engaged in these subsidy 
races. That was when the Uruguay Round was launched, with the objective in agriculture of “the urgent need 
to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions 
and distortions including those related to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and 
instability in world agricultural markets” (Punta del Este Declaration launching the Uruguay Round in 1986).   
One of the outcomes of the nearly-eight-year negotiation was the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAoA), which was built on the so-called “three pillars”: market access, domestic support and export com-
petition. 
Given the context and the objective, the URAoA and its built-in agenda for the continuation of the reform 
process was to address problems of overproduction and putt limits on domestic and export subsidies. No equal 
concern and interests was given to all the three pillars. And among the three pillars, export competition was 
poorly discussed and prescribed in the text. The URAoA made a considerable progress in market access and 
domestic support and more is being done in the DDA.  
Developing countries agreed to the same production restraining objectives of the URAoA. Paradoxically, the 
majority of them suffered from the opposite problem, i.e. underproduction, as a result of their agricultural 
policies. For the past decades, agricultural policy in developing countries has often involved taxes on primary 
agriculture with the revenue being used to fund food subsidies for the urban citizens. This was opposite to 
what happened in the developed countries, where considerable support and protection were provided to the 
agricultural sector.  
Although depressed prices have been the predominant state of world markets over the last 40 years, this has 
not always been the case as the price spikes occurred periodically. But, it was not seen by all participants in 
the world food market. Therefore, not enough attention was given to how to regulate agricultural trade when 
prices of agricultural commodities rise.  
3. WTO Rules Regarding Export Restrictions 
The main instruments and related WTO provisions fall into three general categories as regards their effects on 
the countries, their possible impact on the world market of food commodities and their possible unintentional 
effects on third countries (Sharma and Konandreas, 2008).   
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In the first category are defensive measures that promote freer trade.  An example of such measures is reduction 
of import tariffs. The second category is defensive measures that lower the ability of other countries to meet 
their food import needs.  Export prohibitions and restrictions is an example of measures under this category.  
And the third category comprises measures which are relatively neutral. An example here is domestic stock-
holding operations. 
 In principle, import tariffs have a role to play in reducing the domestic price of imported foodstuffs during 
years of high world market prices.  However, it was noted that applied import duties on basic foodstuffs are 
generally low.  They were already low in 2007, in the 5-10% range, in a majority of low-income food-deficit 
countries. Lowering or eliminating import tariffs could counterbalance only a small part of the large increases 
in food.  In view of the small margin in reducing import tariffs, the effect of this measure on the world market 
is small.  
As mentioned earlier, the WTO has set the rules for trade in low price environment. But as the rule setting 
body, it would have had the reasonable ability to see the opposite situation, and set rules for it.  In fact, the 
WTO does have rules governing what members can do when they impose trade restrictions in response to 
higher world market prices.  
However, these rules are very weak in effect. Export prohibitions, restrictions and export taxation are techni-
cally legal under the WTO rules.  The rules in the URAoA do not prevent countries from imposing export 
restrictions; and export taxation is not even disciplined at all. Many countries have resort to such measures 
during recent food commodity price spike. The high percentages of countries taken these measures reflect the 
ease of use and politically expediency of it.  
1) Current Rules in the WTO Texts 
What is said of export restrictions in the WTO texts actually? As regarding agricultural trade, the provisions 
on export restrictions in the WTO texts can be found in three Articles. 
Firstly, Article XI (part 2(a)) of GATT 1994 General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions states that the 
general prohibition on the use of export restrictions; Secondly, Article XX (part (i) and (j)) of GATT 1994 
General Exceptions which states the exceptions for all products; Thirdly, Article 12 of the URAoA deals with 
Disciplines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions.   
2) What’s in these Texts? 
Paragraph 1 of GATT Article XI indeed forbids prohibitions or restrictions on exports other than through duties 
and taxes. In this sense, this Article seems to be quite restrictive though export taxation is not prohibited. 
However, Paragraph 2(a) makes an important exception to this general rule. It reads that Paragraph 1 shall not 
apply to “export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of food-
stuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party”.    
That is, when one member suffers from food shortage because of low production or rising price, it can impose 
restrictions on exports by means of not only export taxation but also license and quota, and others. The question 
here is that it is not clear how to define “critical shortage”.  
Further, Article XX of GATT 1994 states that as long as the measures taken do not result in “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination among countries, or a disguised restriction on trade”, countries are allowed to use 
measures of export restrictions “as part of a governmental stabilization plan” or “to the acquisition or distribu-
tion of products in general or local short supply”.  This expands the policy space to the Members. 
The link of agricultural trade to these provisions is Article 12 of the URAoA. Thought titled “Disciplines on 
Export Prohibitions and Restrictions”, this Article indicates permission to use export prohibitions or re-
strictions on basic foodstuffs “temporarily” to “prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs”. Both the 
terms “critical shortage” and “temporary” are not defined here or anywhere else. And, the provisions in Article 
12 of the URAoA call for Members to give “due consideration” to other members’ food security needs and 
advance notification and consultation.  
These are only moral restraint on the exporter without any concrete meaning to some extent. It is not clear to 
what extent any of the WTO Members that resorted to export prohibitions or restrictions recently gave due 
consideration importing Members’ food security. 
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Article 12(2) of the URAoA further exempts developing country Members from the general rule in Article 
12(1), unless they are “net food exporters of the specific foodstuff concerned”. Some developing countries are 
now significant exporters of basic foodstuffs and they should obey Article 12(1). However, this means very 
little in practical terms. It is impractical to set criteria for or to list net food exporting developing countries for 
specific products. Should there be a base period as in market access rules to decide who is a net exporting 
country? The situation may change when this country suffer from the so-called “critical shortage”.  
Thus, although WTO does have provisions governing export restriction, essentially and technically, current 
WTO rules allow countries to use export restrictions when they face a domestic shortage. Export taxation is 
never forbidden, and it could be high enough to prohibit exports.  
3) What’s New in the Texts under Negotiation? 
Launched in 2001, the Doha Round or Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is already “eighteen years old”. 
During the proposal stage (stage 1 and stage 2, March 2000 - March 2002), several countries including Canada, 
Switzerland, Korea, Japan and the United States, did propose to strengthen the rules on export restrictions 
during the DDA (WTO, 2004).  Japan (WTO 2000) put forward the most comprehensive proposal to convert 
all export prohibitions and restrictions to export taxes that would be bound and reduced, plus the development 
of rules that could be used in the application of emergency measures.  
But not all countries agree on this. In the Modalities Overview Paper circulated in December 2002, it is said, 
“Some participants consider that export restrictions and, in particular, export taxes are not part of the negotia-
tions on agriculture”, “other participants have submitted specific proposals to strengthen the existing disci-
plines under Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture”. 3 
And, it seems the DDA is still not interested in this and no much attention is given to it. In the First Draft of 
the Modalities Phase circulated in February 2003, only one sentence was given to export restriction, “Except 
as provided for in paragraph 2(a) and 2(b) of Article XI and Articles XX and XXI of GATT 1994, the institution 
of new export prohibitions, restrictions or taxes on foodstuffs shall be prohibited”.4 5 The revisions of this draft 
kept these words unchanged. 
The July Package 2004 (a.k.a. Doha Work Programme) added the phrase “differential export taxes” without 
any definition or explanation to it under the labeled “issues of interest but not agreed”, in addition to a more 
simple sentence to the previous wording “Disciplines on export prohibitions and restrictions in Article 12.1 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture will be strengthened”.6 More than one year later, in the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration, December 2005, “differential export taxes” was still “remain of interest but not agreed” and there 
was “not advanced materially” on export restrictions.7 
The Draft Modalities (version 2006) circulated in June 2006 advanced materially in this regards with an annex: 
“Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture shall be amended to include the measures set out in Annex L”.8 
But this paragraph was in a bracket, meaning it was not agreed. Annex L said, “In order to strengthen the 
existing disciplines on export prohibitions and restrictions of Article XI of GATT 1994, Article 12 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture shall be modified to include the following elements.”9 The annex listed six points 
without concrete obligations on members.  
In the revised Draft Modalities in 2007 and 2008, the annex was incorporated into the main text, with slight 
modifications in words in different versions. And still “differential export taxes” is undefined and no more 
words on it. 10 The latest version was issued in December 2008. The new rules augment Article 12 of the 
URAoA by adding provisions that require Members to follow.  
                                                     
3 See paragraph 39, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_modoverview_e.htm. 
4 See paragraph 38, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_mod1stdraft_e.htm. 
5 Article XXI of GATT 1994 is on Security Exceptions. 
6 See paragraphs 49 and 50, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm. 
7 See paragraphs 24 and 25, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_annex_e.htm#annexa. 
8 See paragraph 116, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/mod_ag_2006_e.htm. 
9 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/mod_annex_2006_e.htm#annexl. 
10 For details of these revisions, please refer to the WTO website, http://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/agric_e/agchairtxt_1aug07_e.htm (version 2007) and http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm 
(versions 2008). 
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One interesting point from the last two paragraphs is that members are required to eliminate existing export 
prohibition and restrictions but are entitled to impose new ones. 
In conclusion, the latest text of the draft Modalities, and the earlier versions as well, suggest that the status quo 
on this issue of export restriction is likely to continue.  Considering their absence from the Articles and new 
provisions mentioned above, stricter rules cannot be instituted during the DDA. And more importantly, Article 
12 of the URAoA is unlikely to delink from that important exception to export restrictions stipulated in the 
GATT 1994. And thirdly, it is also unlikely that the developing countries that are significant net food exporters 
will be subject to tighter disciplines, as this was not mention in all versions of the Draft Modalities.  
The danger of a weak Article 12 is to raise doubts about the world market being a reliable source of food 
supplies (Konandreas, 2008).  Strengthening Article 12, beyond what is envisaged in the draft Modalities text, 
and making non-compliance actionable on the part of affected WTO Members should be a priority under the 
current Doha Round.  
4. Discussions  
The latest texts are those concluded in Bali Package 2013 and Nairobi Package in 2015, while the Buenos 
Aires Ministerial Conference 2017 ended only with decisions on fish subsidies, e-commerce duties. The Min-
isterial Conference did not announce any package.  
The Bali Package states, “We recognize the decrease in recent years in the use of export subsidies subject to 
reduction commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture, as indicated by information contained in Mem-
bers’ notifications to the WTO, and the positive developments that have also taken place in other areas of the 
export competition pillar.” 11 The Nairobi Package says, “Developed Members shall immediately eliminate 
their remaining scheduled export subsidy entitlements as of the date of adoption of this Decision; Developing 
country Members shall eliminate their export subsidy entitlements by the end of 2018.” 12 The Buenos Aires 
MC11 2017 issued a briefing note on agriculture issues. It mentioned the four proposals put forward by the 
members. 13 No agreement has been reached in MC11 (Beunos Aires 2017).  
From these texts and briefing notes, it not clear what the URAoA has been reformed, and how its Article 12 
has been modified. Even the Bali Package and Nairobi Package do not specify how members eliminate their 
remaining scheduled export subsidy, what the measures are, etc. The MC9 (Bali 2013) Ministerial Decision 
agreed on public stockholding for food security purposes, and a further decision was made in 2014. 14 This is 
of course good for countries in short of food to keep food security.  
The ongoing WTO trade negotiations are being conducted during the agriculture product price spikes, while 
previous agricultural trade negotiations were conducted when global prices were lower. They focused on pol-
icies that reduced demand in other countries through protection. Now there seems to be more interest in policies 
that may artificially restrict supply to other countries or expand demand in some countries. What characterizes 
the 2007-2008 food crisis was that it followed a period during which agriculture was largely abandoned by 
many governments because of a generalized change in the development strategies adopted by most countries. 
The price increase experienced in 2010-2011 is also in part a result of policies in a different nature. Among 
others, policies of importance in 2010-2011 are limitation or ban of exports, relative reduction of incentives 
for the production of wheat in the EU and the US, policies to stimulate consumption following the economic 
crisis of 2008-2009. Due to the high commodity prices in recent years, many countries have significantly 
reduced their export subsidies and only a handful of WTO members still use export subsidies, according to a 
WTO survey in 2015. 15 In times of low prices, however, countries often resort to export subsidies — and 
history has shown that once one country does so, others would quickly follow suit. 
                                                     
11 For details of these revisions, please refer to the WTO website, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/min-
ist_e/mc9_e/desci40_e.htm. (Accessed on Oct 10 2018). 
12 For details of these revisions, please refer to the WTO website, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/l980_e.htm. 
(Accessed on Oct 10 2018). 
13 For details of these revisions, please refer to the WTO website, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/brief-
ing_notes_e/bfagric_e.htm. (Accessed on Oct 10 2018). 
14 For details of these revisions, please refer to the WTO website, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/min-
ist_e/mc9_e/desci38_e.htm and https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/nov14stockholding_e.htm. (Accessed on Oct 
10 2018). 
15 For details of these revisions, please refer to the WTO website, https://docs.wto.org/dol2festaff/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?file-
name=q:/G/AG/W125R3.pdf. (Accessed on Oct 10 2018). 
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5. Conclusion 
The surge in global food prices is not alone in the historical context. Though many factors contributed to it, it 
has its origins in long-term trade policies that led to thin and potentially volatile markets, especially in the 
developing world.  Then, the sudden emergence of other factors – energy price increases and demand for 
biofuels, drought, and short term policy responses – provided the occurrence for today’s crisis.   
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is not a food shortage on the global basis. Agricultural production is 
capable of rising, and is capable of keeping pace with rising demand for food. However, to translate the capa-
bility at global level into national level, the trade restrictions and unfair distortions that impede food production 
and trade must be eliminated or reduced. Distorting trade policy and policies protecting agriculture may be 
harmful to the poor.  The most effective trade policy response to high food prices over the long term is greater 
liberalization around the world, reducing trade-distorting subsidies and tariffs, and strengthening WTO rules 
on export restrictions. For its effectiveness, trade liberalization needs to be complemented by other domestic 
policies aiming at increasing agricultural productivity, linking rural communities to markets, and ensuring that 
poor benefit from trade liberalization.   
While the WTO cannot provide anything immediately to help solve the current food crisis, the WTO Doha 
Round of trade negotiations can be part of the medium-to-long term response to the food price crisis (WTO, 
2008b). Therefore, greater commitment to multilateral trade rules should strengthen during the Doha Round 
that discipline border barriers, domestic support, export subsidies, and export restrictions.  
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